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Abstract
DeepRobust is a PyTorch [1] adversarial learning library which aims to build a
comprehensive and easy-to-use platform to foster this research field. It currently
contains more than 10 attack algorithms and 8 defense algorithms in image domain
and 9 attack algorithms and 4 defense algorithms in graph domain, under a variety
of deep learning architectures. In this manual, we introduce the main contents of
DeepRobust with detailed instructions. The library is kept updated and can be
found at https: // github. com/ DSE-MSU/ DeepRobust .
1 Introduction
Deep learning has advanced numerous machine learning tasks such as image classification, speech
recognition and graph representation learning. Since deep learning has been increasingly adopted
by real-world safety-critical applications such as autonomous driving, healthcare and education, it
is crucial to examine its vulnerability and safety issues. Szegedy et al. [2] first found that Deep
Neural Networks (DNNs) are vulnerable to small designed perturbations, which are called adversarial
perturbations. Figure 1(a) demonstrated adversarial example in the domains of images and graphs.
Since then, tremendous efforts have been made on developing attack methods to fool DNNs and
designing their counter measures. As a result, there is a growing need to build a comprehensive
platform for adversarial attacks and defenses. Such platform enables us to systematically experiment
on existing algorithms and efficiently test new algorithms that can deepen our understandings, and
thus immensely foster this research field.
(a) Image Adversarial Example
(b) Graph Adversarial Example
Figure 1: An Illustration of Adversarial Example.
Currently there are some existing libraries in this research field, such as Cleverhans [3], advertorch [4].
They mainly focused on attack methods in the image domain. However, little attention has been
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paid on defense methods. Furthermore, the majority of them are dedicated to the image domain
while largely ignoring other domains such as graph-structured data. Our library DeepRobust not only
provides representative attack and defense methods in the image domain, but also covers algorithms
for graph data. This repository contains most classic and advanced algorithms
The remaining of this report is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces key concepts for adversarial
attacks and defenses. Section 3 gives an overview of the DeepRobust library. Sections 4 and 5
introduce math background and implementation details of the algorithms in the library for the image
and graph domains, separately. Section 6 provides concrete examples to demonstrate how to use the
library.
2 Foundations of Adversarial Attacks and Defenses
The main goal of attack algorithms is to make invisible perturbations on data and then lead to wrong
classification of a classifier which normally has good performance on clean data. The study of attacks
can be categorized from different perspectives such as attackers’ goal, attackers’ ability and so on.
According to attackers’ goal, attack methods can be categorized as follows:
• Poisoning Attack vs. Evasion Attack
Poisoning Attack: Poisoning attacks refer to the attacking algorithms that allow an attacker
to insert/modify several fake samples into the training data of a DNN algorithm. This training
process with fake samples can cause bad performance on the test data.
Evasion Attack: For evasion attack, the victim classifiers are fixed and normally have good
performance on benign test samples. The adversaries do not have authority to change the
classifier or its parameters, instead they craft some fake samples that the classifier can neither
correctly classify nor distinguish them as an unusual input. In other words, the adversaries
generate some fraudulent examples to evade detection by the classifier.
• Targeted Attack vs. Non-Targeted Attack
Targeted attack: When the victim sample (x, y) is given, where x is feature vector and y ∈ Y
is the ground truth label of x, the adversary aims to induce the classifier to give a specific label
t ∈ Y to the perturbed sample x′.
Non-Targeted Attack: If there is no specific t given, an adversarial example can be viewed a
successful attack as long as it is classified as any wrong label.
According to attackers’ ability, attack methods can be grouped as follows:
• White-Box attack: the adversary has access to all the information of the target model, including
its architecture, parameters, gradients, etc.
• Black-Box attack: In a black-box attack setting, the inner configuration of the target model is
unavailable to adversaries. This type of methods often based on a bunch of attack queries.
• Grey-Box attack: In a gray box attack setting, the attacker trains a generative model for
producing adversarial examples in a white-box setting. Once the generative model is trained, it
can be used to craft adversarial examples in a black-box setting.
To mitigate the risk of adversarial attack, different countermeasures have been investigated. There are
four main categories of defenses. The first one is robustness optimization, that is to do adversarial
training, namely to use adversarial examples to retrain the model. Another type is adversarial example
detection. The goal is to distinguish adversarial examples from data distribution. The third type is
gradient masking. This type of defense mainly includes some pre-processing methods to hide the
gradient, in order to make the optimization in attack process much harder. The last type, provable
defense, has gradually becomes a important stream of defense. Those methods aims to provide
adversarial robustness guarantee.
3 An Overview of DeepRobust
In this section, we aim to first provide an overview of the DeepRobust library including environment
requirements and the overview design of DeepRobust.
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3.1 Environment Requirements and Setup
DeepRobust works on python ≥ 3.6 and pytorch ≥ 1.2.0. All dependencies are listed in Appendix A.
After downloading this repository, run setup.py to install DeepRobust into local python environment.
3.2 The Overview Design
This repository mainly includes two components – the image component and the graph component as
below. The directory structure can be found in Appendix B.
• Image package
– attack
– defense
– netmodels
– evaluation
– configs
• Graph package
– targeted attack
– global attack
– defense
– data
The Image Component: According to the function of each program, the image component is divided
into several sub-packages and contents. Attack sub-package includes attack base class and attack
algorithms. Defense sub-package contains defense base class and defense algorithms. In Section 3,
we will give specific introduction for each algorithm. Netmodels contains different network model
classes. Users can simply generate a victim model by instantiating one model class. Through the
evaluation program, we provide an easy-to-use API to test attack against defense. All the default
parameters are saved in configs.
The Graph Component: The graph component contains several sub-packages and contents based
on the functions. Targeted-attack sub-package includes the targeted attack base class and famous
targeted attack algorithms. Similarly, global attack base class and global attack algorithms are
included in global-attack sub-package. Defense sub-package contains GCN model and other methods
for defending graph adversarial attack. Besides, sub-package data provides an easy access to public
benchmark datasets including Cora, Cora-ml, Citeseer, Polblogs and Pubmed as well as pre-attacked
graph data.
4 Image Component
In this section, we aim to give an introduction of the interface for attack and defense methods in the
image domain. Meanwhile, we provide algorithm description and implementation details for each
algorithm. A comprehensive survey about attack and defense methods in the image domain can be
found in [5].
4.1 Attacks
This subsection introduces the API for the attack methods in the image domain. Currently, this
package covers nine representative attack algorithms including LBFGS[2], FGSM[6], PGD[7],
CW[8], onepixel[9], deepfool[10], BPDA[11], Universal[12] and Nattack[13].
For these algorithms, we currently support the following neural networks and datasets:
Supported networks:
• CNN
• ResNet-18/34
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• DenseNet
• VGG-11/13/16/19
Supported datasets:
• MNIST
• CIFAR10
4.1.1 Attack Base Class
deeprobust.image.attack.base attack
In order to make further development flexible and extendable, we organize functions shared by
different methods in one module as the attack base class. The main body of the algorithm is override
in each subclass. Following are detailed instructions for the functions contained in this class:
• init (self, model, device = ’cuda’)
Initialization is completed in this function.
Parameters:
– model: the victim model.
– device: whether the program is run on GPU or CPU.
• check type device(self, image, label, **kwargs)
The main purpose for this function is to convert the input into a unified data type so that
they can be correctly used in the algorithm procedure.
Parameters:
– image: clean input.
– label: ground truth label corresponding to the clean input.
– **kwargs: optional input dependent on each derived class.
• parse params(self, **kwargs)
This function provides the interface for these user defined parameters.
Parameters:
– **kwargs: optional input dependent on each derived class.
• generate(self, image, label, **kwargs)
Call generate() to launch the attack algorithms.
Parameters:
– **kwargs: optional input. Parameters for the attack algorithms.
4.1.2 Attack algorithms
deeprobust.image.attack.lbfgs L-BFGS attack[2] is the key work that has arisen people’s attention
on the neural network’s vulnerability to small perturbation. This work tries to find a minimal distorted
adversarial example by solving a intuitive box-constraint optimization problem:
minimize ||x′ − x||22
subject to C(x′) = t and x′ ∈ [0, 1]m (1)
where x′ is the adversarial example and x is the clean example. We aim to find an adversarial example
which could be classified as certain class and is close to the clean image. From the implementation
perspective, addressing this optimization problem with two constraints is hard. Thus, this work turns
to solve an alternative problem by doing binary search on a parameter c to balance the trade off
between perturb constraint and attack success for target class, and then use the LBFGS algorithm to
get an approximate solution:
minimize c||x′ − x||22+L(θ, x′, t)
subject to x′ ∈ [0, 1]m (2)
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where L(θ, x′, t) denotes the loss value of x′ for the target class t.
deeprobust.image.attack.fgsm Fast Gradient Sign Method(FGSM)[6] is an one-step optimization
problem. The intuition is to move the input sample along the gradient direction to achieve highest
loss value corresponding to the ground truth label. Thus the perturbed samples could fool the network
with high confidence. To guarantee that the adversarial example lies in a small nearby area of starting
the point x, the gradient descent step is followed by a clip operation. Thus, the formulation of the
process is described as follows:
x′ = Clipx,(x+ sign(∇xL(θ, x, y))) (3)
Here, Clip denotes a function to project its argument to the surface of x’s -neighbor ball.
deeprobust.image.attack.pgd Projected Gradient Descent(PGD)[7] is an iterative version of the
FGSM attack. The formulation of generating x′ is:
x0 = x
xt+1 = Clipx,(x
t + αsign(∇xL(θ, xt, y)))
(4)
It chooses the origin image as a starting point. PGD attack could create strong adversarial examples
and is often used as a baseline attack for defense methods.
deeprobust.image.attack.deepfool Deepfool attack aims to find a shortest path to let the data point
x go across the decision boundary. It starts from an binary classifier. Denote the hyperplane as
F = {x : wT + b = 0}. The minimum perturbation is the distance from the data point x0 to the
hyperplane that can be:
r∗(x0) = − f(x)||w||2w (5)
This calculation can be extended to general classifiers and also extend this problem to lp norm
constraint perturbation. Compare to other methods like FGSM and PGD, Deepfool attack produces
less perturbation to attack successfully.
deeprobust.image.attack.cw Carlini and Wagner’s attack [8] aims to solve the same problem as
defined in L-BFGS attack, namely trying to find the minimally-distorted perturbation.
It addresses the problem by instead solving:
minimize ||x− x′||22+c · f(x′, t) subject to x′ ∈ [0, 1]m (6)
where f is defined as f(x′, t) = (maxi6=t Z(x′)i − Z(x′)t)+. Here, Z() is the logits function.
Minimizing f(x′, t) encourages the algorithm to find an x′ that has the larger score for class t than
any other label, so that the classifier will predict x′ as the class t. Next, by applying a line search on
the constant c, it can find the x′ that has the least distance to x.
deeprobust.image.attack.universal Previous methods only consider one specific targeted victim
sample x. However, the work [12] devises an algorithm that successfully misleads a classifier’s
decision on almost all test images. It tries to find a perturbation δ satisfying:
1. ||δ||p≤ .
2. P
x∼D(x)
(f(x+ δ) 6= f(x)) ≥ 1− σ.
Formulation 1 is constraint of the norm of perturbation size and formulation 2 set a threshold for
the probability of misclassification. Actually it aims to find a invisible perturbation δ such that the
classifier gives wrong decisions on most of the samples.
deeprobust.image.attack.onepixel One pixel attack [14] constraints the perturbation by the l0
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norm instead of l2 norm or l∞ norm. That is to say, finding the minimum number of pixels to perturb.
Differential evolutionary algorithm(DE) is applied to solve this optimization problem.
deeprobust.image.attack.bpda Backward Pass Differentiable Approximation(BPDA) [11] is a
technique to attack defenses where gradients are not readily available. BPDA solves this problem by
finding an approximation function for the non-differential layer and calculating the gradient through
the approximation function.
deeprobust.image.attack.nattack Nattack [13] is a black box attack trying to find a probability
density distribution of where adversarial samples lying over a small region centered around the input.
One sample that are drawn from this distribution is likely to be an adversarial example.
It uses an intuitive way to find this density distribution. First, it initializes the distribution with
random parameters. Then, it samples from this distribution several times as the neural network input
and calculates the average loss value of those samples. Thus, the average loss is a function of the
distribution parameters. Finally, It performs gradient decent on the average loss and updates the
distribution parameters. It will iterates this process until successful attack.
4.2 Defense Subpackage
This subsection introduces the API for the defense methods in the image domain. Until now, this
package covers three categories of defense methods including adversarial training, gradient masking
and detection.
4.2.1 Defense Base Class
deeprobust.image.defense.base defense
This module is the base class of all the adversarial training algorithms. It provides basic components
for defense methods. Following functions are contained in this class:
• init (self, model, device)
Parameter initialization is completed in this function.
Parameters:
– model: the attack victim model.
– device: whether the program is run on GPU or CPU.
• parse params(self, **kwargs)
This function provides the interface for user defined parameters.
Parameters:
– **kwargs: optional input dependent on each derived class.
• generate(self, train loader, test loader, **kwargs)
Call generate() to launch the defense.
Parameters:
– **kwargs: optional input dependent on each derived class.
• loss(self, output, target)
Calculate the training loss. This function will be overridden by each defense class according
to the algorithms requirements.
Parameters:
– output: model output.
– target: ground truth label.
• adv data(self, model, data, target, **kwargs)
Generate adversarial training samples for robust training. This function will be overridden
by each defense class according to algorithms requirements.
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Parameters:
– model: The victim model used to generate the adversarial example.
– data: clean data.
– target: target label
– **kwargs: optional parameters.
• train(self, train loader, optimizer, epoch)
Call train to train the adversarial model.
Parameters:
– train loader: the dataloader used to train robust model.
– optimizer: the optimizer for the training process.
– epoch: maximum epoch for the training process.
– **kwargs: optional input dependent on each derived class.
• test(self, test loader)
Call test() function to test adversarial model.
Parameters:
– test loader: the dataloader used to test model.
4.2.2 Adversarial Training
deeprobust.image.defense.fgsmtraining FGSM adversarial training [6] aims to improve model
accuracy by training with adversarial examples. It generates adversarial examples in each iteration
and updates model parameters via these adversarial examples.
deeprobust.image.defense.fast Fast [15] is an improved version of FGSM adversarial training.
This work finds out that by simply adding a random initialization into the adversarial training samples’
generating process, the model robustness would improve significantly
deeprobust.image.defense.pgdtraining PGD adversarial training uses adversarial examples gener-
ated by PGD instead of FGSM to train the model and achieve overall high performance.
deeprobust.image.defense.YOPO You-only-Propagate-Once(YOPO) [16] is an accelerated version
of the PGD adversarial training. When it generates the PGD adversarial examples for a N layer
network, it approximates the derivative of first N − 1 layer as a constant, therefore there is no need to
calculate the whole back propagation process in every iteration. Thus, the training time would be
remarkably reduced.
deprobust.image.defense.trades The work [17] proposes a adversarial training strategy which
encourages the clean samples and adversarial examples to be close in feature space. Its training
objective is to minimize the loss:
L(xtrades) = L(f(x), y) + max||x′−x||≤
L(f(x), f(x′)) (7)
This loss function can be devided into two parts, the first part is the natural loss while the second
part set a goal for minimizing the distance between the classifier output for those examples that are
close in input space. Similar to the PGD adversarial training strategy, in each step, it first solves the
inner maximization problem to find an optimal x′, and then updates model parameters to minimize
the outside loss value.
4.2.3 Gradient Masking
deeprobust.image.defense.TherEncoding Thermometer encoding [18] is one way to mask the
gradient information of the DNN models, in order to avoid the attacker from finding successful
adversarial examples. It uses a preprocessor to discretize an image’s pixel value xi into a l-dimensional
vector τ(xi). (e.g. when l = 10, τ(0.66) = 1111110000). The vector τ(xi) acts as a “thermometer”
to record the pixel xi’s value.
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4.2.4 Detection
deeprobust.image.defense.LIDclassifier Local Intrinsic Dimensionality(LID) detection [19] tries
to train a classifier to distinguish adversarial examples from normal examples based on the LID
features. Starting from a sample, it calculates the number of data points in a ball of a certain distance,
and LID features measure the growth rate of the number of data points as the distance increases.
5 Graph Package
The design of graph package is slightly different from that of the image package. Specifically, graph
package includes three main components, targeted attack, untargeted attack and defense. For these
algorithms, supported networks and datasets are listed as follows:
Supported network:
• GCN
Supported datasets:
• Cora
• Cora-ml
• Citeseer
• Polblogs
• Pubmed
More details about adversarial attack and defense can be found in [20]. In the following, we are going
to illustrate the details of various subpackages.
5.1 Targeted Attack Subpackage
deeprobust.graph.targeted attack This module introduces the API for targted attack methods in
the graph package. In total, this package covers 5 algorithms: FGA [21], Nettack [22], RL-S2V [23],
IG-Attack [24] and RND [22].
deeprobust.graph.targeted attack.fga FGSM [6] can also be applied to attack graph data but it
needs some modification to fit into the binary nature of graph data. One representative method to
solve this problem is FGA [21]. Basically, FGA first calculates the gradient of attack loss with respect
to the graph structure and greedily chooses the perturbation with largest gradient.
deeprobust.graph.targeted attack.nettack The work [22] proposes an attack method called Net-
tack to generate structure and feature attacks on graphs. Nettack first selects possible perturbation
candidates that would not violate degree distribution and feature co-occurrence of the original graph.
Then it greedily chooses the perturbation that has the largest score to modify the graph. By doing this
repeatedly until reaching the perturbation constraint, it can get the final modified graph.
deeprobust.graph.targeted attack.rl s2v To do black-box query on the victim model, reinforce-
ment learning is introduced. RL-S2V [23] aims to employ the reinforcement learning technique to
generate adversarial attacks on graph data under the black-box setting. It models the attack procedure
as a Markov Decision Process (MDP) and the attacker is allowed to modify m edges to change the
predicted label of the target node u. Further, the Q-learning algorithm [25] is adopted to solve the
MDP and guide the attacker to modify the graph.
deeprobust.graph.targeted attack.ig attack Due to the discrete nature of graph data, how to
precisely approximate the gradient of adversarial perturbations is a big challenge. To solve this
issue, IG attack [24] suggests to use integrated gradient [26] to better search for adversarial edges
8
and feature perturbations. During the attacking process, the attacker iteratively chooses the edge or
feature which has the strongest effect to the adversarial objective.
deeprobust.graph.targeted attack.rnd RND is a baseline of attacking method used in [22]. Based
on the assumption that unequal class labels are hindering classification, it modifies the graph structure
sequentially. To be specific, given the target node, in each step it randomly samples nodes whose
labels are different from the target node and then connects them in the graph.
5.2 Untargeted Attack Subpackage
deeprobust.graph.global attack This module introduces the API for untargted attack methods
in the graph package. Currrently, this package covers 4 algorithms: Metattack [27], PGD [28],
Min-max [28] and DICE [29].
deeprobust.graph.global attack.metattack Aiming to modify graph structure, Metattack [27] is
a kind of untargeted poisoning attacks. Basically, it treats the graph structure matrix as a hyper-
parameter and calculates the meta gradient of the loss function with respect to graph structure. Further,
A greedy approach is applied to select the perturbation based on the meta gradient.
deeprobust.graph.global attack.topology attack The work [28] considers two different settings:
1) attacking a fixed GNN and 2) attacking a re-trainable GNN. For attacking a fixed GNN, it utilizes
the Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) algorithm in [7] to search the optimal structure perturbation.
This is called PGD attack. For the re-trainable GNNs, the attack problem is formulated as a min-max
form where the inner maximization can be solved by gradient ascent and the outer minimization can
be solved by PGD. It is called Min-max attack.
deeprobust.graph.global attack.dice DICE [29] means “delete internally, connect externally”
where it randomly connects nodes with different labels or drops edges between nodes sharing the
same label. It is noted that DICE is a white-box attack and widely used as a baseline in comparing
the performance of untargeted attacks.
5.3 Defense Subpackage
5.3.1 Adversarial Training
deeprobust.graph.defense.adv training Since adversarial training is a widely used countermeasure
for adversarial attacks in the image data [6], we can also adopt this strategy to defend graph adversarial
attacks. The min-max optimization problem indicates that adversarial training involves two processes:
(1) generating perturbations that maximize the prediction loss and (2) updating model parameters
that minimize the prediction loss. By alternating the above two processes attractively, we can train a
robust model against adversarial attacks. Since there are two inputs for graphs, i.e., adjacency matrix
and attribute matrix, adversarial training can be done on them separately.
5.3.2 Pre-processing
dedprobust.graph.defense.gcn jaccard The work [24] proposes a preprocessing method based on
two empirical observations of the attack methods: (1) Attackers usually prefer to adding edges over
removing edges or modifying features and (2) Attackers tend to connect dissimilar nodes. Based on
these findings, they propose a defense method by eliminating the edges whose two end nodes have
small Jaccard Similarity [30].
dedprobust.graph.defense.gcn svd It is observed that Nettack [22] generates the perturbations
which mainly change the small singular values of the graph adjacency matrix [31]. Thus it proposes to
preprocess the perturbed adjacency matrix by using truncated SVD to get its low-rank approximation.
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5.3.3 Attention Mechanism
deprobust.graph.defense.rgcn Different from the above preprocessing methods which try to ex-
clude adversarial perturbations, RGCN [32] aims to train a robust GNN model by penalizing model’s
weights on adversarial edges or nodes. Based on the assumption that adversarial nodes may have
high prediction uncertainty, they propose to model the hidden representation of nodes as Gaussian
distribution with mean value and variance where the uncertainty can be reflected in the variance.
When aggregating the information from neighbor nodes, it applies an attention mechanism to penalize
the nodes with high variance.
6 Hand-on Case Studies
In this section, we would give concrete examples to illustrate how to use this repository. For each
type of methods, we provide one demo code.
6.1 Image Case Studies
6.1.1 Train Network
In deeprobust.image.netmodels, we provide several deep network architecture. Call train() to train
a model.
import deeprobust.image.netmodels.train_model as trainmodel
trainmodel.train(’CNN’, ’MNIST ’, ’cuda’, 20)
6.1.2 Attack
To launch an attack method, The first step is to import certain attack class from deepro-
bust.image.attack. Then, we need to initialize a victim model and create a dataloader, which
contains the test images to be generated as adversarial examples. Then, we can feed the model and
data to the attack method. The output would be adversarial examples.
from deeprobust.image.attack.pgd import PGD
from deeprobust.image.config import attack_params
import deeprobust.image.netmodels.resnet as resnet
model = resnet.ResNet18 ().to(’cuda’)
model.load_state_dict(torch.load \
("./ trained_models/MNIST_CNN_epoch_20.pt"))
model.eval()
transform_val = transforms.Compose ([ transforms.ToTensor ()])
test_loader = torch.utils.data.DataLoader(
datasets.CIFAR10(’deeprobust/image/data’,
train=False , download=True , transform=transform_val),
batch_size =10, shuffle=True)
x, y = next(iter(test_loader ))
x = x.to(’cuda’).float ()
adversary = PGD(model , device)
Adv_img = adversary.generate(x, y, ** attack_params[’PGD_CIFAR10 ’])
6.1.3 Defense
Defense method can be imported in deeprobust.image.defense. We need to feed a model structure
and a dataloader to the defense model. The output would be adversarial trained model and the
performance on both clean data and adversarial data.
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from deeprobust.image.defense.pgdtraining import PGDtraining
from deeprobust.image.config import defense_params
from deeprobust.image.netmodels.CNN import Net
import torch
from torchvision import datasets , transforms
model = Net()
train_loader = torch.utils.data.DataLoader(
datasets.MNIST(’deeprobust/image/defense/data’,
train=True , download=True ,
transform=transforms.Compose ([ transforms.ToTensor ()])) ,
batch_size =100, shuffle=True)
test_loader = torch.utils.data.DataLoader(
datasets.MNIST(’deeprobust/image/defense/data’,
train=False ,
transform=transforms.Compose ([ transforms.ToTensor ()])) ,
batch_size =1000 , shuffle=True)
defense = PGDtraining(model , ’cuda’)
defense.generate(train_loader , test_loader , \
** defense_params["PGDtraining_MNIST"])
6.1.4 Evaluation
We provide a simple access to evaluate the performance of attack toward defense.
cd DeepRobust
#creat a victim model
python examples/image/test_train.py
#evaluation attack
python deeprobust/image/evaluation_attack.py --attack_method PGD
--attack_model CNN --dataset MNIST
6.2 Graph Case Studies
6.2.1 Attack Graph Neural Networks
We show an example of attacking graph neural networks. We will use a linearized GCN as the
surrogate model and apply untargeted Metattack to generate perturbed graph on the Cora citation
dataset.
First we need to import the packages we are going to use in the head of the code and load Cora
dataset.
import torch
from deeprobust.graph.data import Dataset
from deeprobust.graph.defense import GCN
from deeprobust.graph.global_attack import Metattack
# load dataset
data = Dataset(root=’/tmp/’, name=’cora’, setting=’nettack ’)
adj , features , labels = data.adj , data.features , data.labels
idx_train ,idx_val ,idx_test = data.idx_train ,data.idx_val ,data.idx_test
Then set up the surrogate model to be attacked.
# set up surrogate model
device = torch.device("cuda:0" \
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if torch.cuda.is_available () else "cpu")
surrogate = GCN(nfeat=features.shape [1], nclass=labels.max(). item ()+1,
nhid=16, with_relu=False , device=device)
surrogate = surrogate.to(device)
surrogate.fit(features , adj , labels , idx_train)
Then we use Metattack to generate perturbations to attack the surrogate model. Here the variable
modified adj is the perturbed graph generated by Metattack.
# use Metattack to generate attacks
model = Metattack(surrogate , nnodes=adj.shape [0],
feature_shape=features.shape , device=device)
model = model.to(device)
perturbations = int (0.05 * (adj.sum() // 2)) # set attack budget
model.attack(features , adj , labels , idx_train ,
idx_unlabeled , perturbations)
modified_adj = model.modified_adj
6.2.2 Defend Graph Adversarial Attacks
We show an example of defending graph adversarial attacks. We will use Metattack as the attacking
method and GCN-Jaccard as the defense method.
First, we import all the packages we need to use and load the clean graph and pre-attacked graph of
Cora dataset.
import torch
from deeprobust.graph.data import Dataset , PtbDataset
from deeprobust.graph.defense import GCN , GCNJaccard
import numpy as np
np.random.seed (15)
# load clean graph
data = Dataset(root=’/tmp/’, name=’cora’, setting=’nettack ’)
adj , features , labels = data.adj , data.features , data.labels
idx_train ,idx_val ,idx_test = data.idx_train ,data.idx_val ,data.idx_test
# load pre -attacked graph by mettack
perturbed_data = PtbDataset(root=’/tmp/’, name=’cora’)
perturbed_adj = perturbed_data.adj
Then we set up the defense model GCN-Jaccard and test it performance on the perturbed graph.
# Set up defense model and test performance
device = torch.device("cuda:0" \
if torch.cuda.is_available () else "cpu")
model = GCNJaccard(nfeat=features.shape [1], nclass=labels.max()+1,
nhid=16, device=device)
model = model.to(device)
model.fit(features , perturbed_adj , labels , idx_train)
model.eval()
output = model.test(idx_test)
As a comparison, we can also set up GCN model and test its performance on the perturbed graph.
# Test GCN on the perturbed graph
model = GCN(nfeat=features.shape [1], nclass=labels.max()+1,
nhid=16, device=device)
model = model.to(device)
model.fit(features , perturbed_adj , labels , idx_train)
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model.eval()
output = model.test(idx_test)
7 Conclusion
Our main goal is to provide a comprehensive, easy-to-use platform for researchers who are interested
in adversarial attack and defense. In the future, we would support larger datasets and more model
architectures. Moreover, we will keep including the newest models and updating this repository.
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Appendix A Environment Dependencies
Dependency Version
torch ≥1.2.0
torchvision ≥0.4.0
numpy ≥1.17.1
matplotlib ≥3.1.1
scipy ≥1.3.1
Pillow ≥7.0.0
scikit learn ≥0.22.1
skimage 0
tensorboardX ≥2
tqdm ≥4.42.1
texttable ≥1.6.2
numba ≥0.48.0
Table 1: Dependencies
Appendix B Structure tree
|___ LICENSE
|___ README.md
|___ adversary_examples
|___ deeprobust
| |___ __init__.py
| |___ graph
| | |___ README.md
| | |___ __init__.py
| | |___ black_box.py
| | |___ data
| | | |___ __init__.py
| | | |___ attacked_data.py
| | | |__ dataset.py
| | |___ defense
| | | |___ __init__.py
| | | |___ adv_training.py
| | | |___ gcn.py
| | | |___ gcn_preprocess.py
| | | |___ r_gcn.py
| | | |__ r_gcn.py.backup
| | |___ examples
| | | |___ test_adv_train_evasion.py
| | | |___ test_adv_train_poisoning.py
| | | |___ test_dice.py
| | | |___ test_fgsm.py
| | | |___ test_gcn.py
| | | |___ test_gcn_jaccard.py
| | | |___ test_gcn_svd.py
| | | |___ test_mettack.py
| | | |___ test_nettack.py
| | | |___ test_nipa.py
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| | | |___ test_random.py
| | | |___ test_rgcn.py
| | | |___ test_rl_s2v.py
| | | |___ test_rnd.py
| | | |__ test_topology_attack.py
| | |___ global_attack
| | | |___ __init__.py
| | | |___ base_attack.py
| | | |___ dice.py
| | | |___ mettack.py
| | | |___ nipa.py
| | | |___ random.py
| | | |__ topology_attack.py
| | |___ requirements.txt
| | |___ rl
| | | |___ env.py
| | | |___ nipa.py
| | | |___ nipa_config.py
| | | |___ nipa_env.py
| | | |___ nipa_nstep_replay_mem.py
| | | |___ nipa_q_net_node.py
| | | |___ nstep_replay_mem.py
| | | |___ q_net_node.py
| | | |___ rl_s2v.py
| | | |___ rl_s2v_config.py
| | | |__ rl_s2v_env.py
| | |___ targeted_attack
| | | |___ __init__.py
| | | |___ base_attack.py
| | | |___ evaluation.py
| | | |___ fgsm.py
| | | |___ nettack.py
| | | |___ rl_s2v.py
| | | |__ rnd.py
| | |__ utils.py
| |__image
| |___ README.md
| |___ __init__.py
| |___ adversary_examples
| |___ attack
| | |___ BPDA.py
| | |___ Nattack.py
| | |___ Universal.py
| | |___ YOPOpgd.py
| | |___ __init__.py
| | |___ base_attack.py
| | |___ cw.py
| | |___ deepfool.py
| | |___ fgsm.py
| | |___ l2_attack.py
| | |___ lbfgs.py
| | |___ onepixel.py
| | |__ pgd.py
| |___ config.py
| |___ data
| |___ defense
| | |___ LIDclassifier.py
| | |___ TherEncoding.py
| | |___ YOPO.py
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| | |___ __init__.py
| | |___ advexample_pgd.png
| | |___ base_defense.py
| | |___ fast.py
| | |___ fgsmtraining.py
| | |___ pgdtraining.py
| | |___ test_PGD_defense.py
| | |___ trade.py
| | |__ trades.py
| |___ evaluation_attack.py
| |___ netmodels
| | |___ CNN.py
| | |___ CNN_multilayer.py
| | |___ YOPOCNN.py
| | |___ __init__.py
| | |___ resnet.py
| | |___ train_model.py
| | |__ train_resnet.py
| |___ optimizer.py
| |___ synset_words.txt
| |__ utils.py
|___ examples
| |___ graph
| | |___ test_adv_train_evasion.py
| | |___ test_adv_train_poisoning.py
| | |___ test_dice.py
| | |___ test_fgsm.py
| | |___ test_gcn.py
| | |___ test_gcn_jaccard.py
| | |___ test_gcn_svd.py
| | |___ test_mettack.py
| | |___ test_nettack.py
| | |___ test_nipa.py
| | |___ test_random.py
| | |___ test_rgcn.py
| | |___ test_rl_s2v.py
| | |__ test_rnd.py
| |__ image
| |___ __init__.py
| |___ __pycache__
| | |___ __init__.cpython -36. pyc
| | |__ test_cw.cpython -36. pyc
| |___ test1.py
| |___ test_PGD.py
| |___ test_cw.py
| |___ test_deepfool.py
| |___ test_fgsm.py
| |___ test_lbfgs.py
| |___ test_nattack.py
| |___ test_onepixel.py
| |___ test_pgdtraining.py
| |___ test_trade.py
| |___ test_train.py
| |__ testprint_mnist.py
|___ get -pip.py
|___ requirements.txt
|___ setup.py
|___ tree.md
|__ tutorials
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|___ __init__.py
|___ test1.py
|___ test_PGD.py
|___ test_cw.py
|___ test_deepfool.py
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|___ test_nattack.py
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